Kim Kataguiri: If we have this across the whole state, they will be forced to leave the state; the coragidos will hardly be able to remain in the state in that situation.
Kim Kataguiri: Another point I also think is important is to have the collaboration of the municipalities.
And I think that in the discretionary distribution of ICMS we could send more resources to cities that have the greatest improvement in the indicators.
Kim Kataguiri: So the municipalities, as we know today — it has already been recognized by the STF (Supreme Federal Tribunal) and the National Congress — also have competence regarding security through the municipal guards, which are in reality municipal police, and to create awards and incentives so that the cities that bring the best indicators, those that show the greatest improvement in those indicators — so if a city is in a situation of calamity and improves, it receives reinforcement to invest in public security; if that city's public security is already good, we will not reward it for already being in a good situation, but if it further improves that city's situation through the repassacionário of the TMS, because, and I see this mainly from the federal perspective, but which is also reflected at the State level, we have a kind of perverse incentive.
Kim Kataguiri: Because many times the distribution of funds goes to cities and states that have the worst indicators, under the justification that if things are worse they need more money.